Real-vs-ideal World Security|Course hero helper

Posted: February 15th, 2023

  1. Problem statement: what kind of problem is presented by the authors and why this problem is important?
  2. Approach & Design: briefly describe the approach designed by the authors
  3. Strengths and Weaknesses: list the strengths and weaknesses, in your opinion
  4. Evaluation: how did the authors evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme? What kind of workload was designed and used?
  5. Conclusion: by your own judgement.

    A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management Service

    José Bacelar Almeida

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    University of Minho and INESC TEC

    Manuel Barbosa

    University of Porto (FCUP) and

    INESC TEC

    Gilles Barthe

    IMDEA Software Institute

    MPI for Security and Privacy

    Matthew Campagna

    Amazon Web Services

    Ernie Cohen

    Amazon Web Services

    Benjamin Gregoire

    INRIA Sophia Antipolis

    Vitor Pereira

    University of Porto (FCUP) and

    INESC TEC

    Bernardo Portela

    University of Porto (FCUP) and

    INESC TEC

    Pierre-Yves Strub

    École Polytechnique

    Serdar Tasiran

    Amazon Web Services

    ABSTRACT We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain

    management protocol of Amazon Web Services’ KMS (Key Man-

    agement Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS

    and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of

    AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of

    encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely

    implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under stan-

    dard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in

    the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt devel-

    opment to date.

    CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Key management; Logic and veri- fication.

    KEYWORDS Provable-Security; Machine-Checked Proof; Key Management

    ACM Reference Format: José Bacelar Almeida, Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Matthew Campagna,

    Ernie Cohen, Benjamin Gregoire, Vitor Pereira, Bernardo Portela, Pierre-

    Yves Strub, and Serdar Tasiran. 2019. A Machine-Checked Proof of Security

    for AWS Key Management Service. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security (CCS ’19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 16 pages. https://doi.

    org/10.1145/3319535.3354228

    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or

    classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed

    for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation

    on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the

    author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or

    republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission

    and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.

    CCS ’19, November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.

    ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11. . . $15.00

    https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354228

    1 INTRODUCTION Today’s cloud services use sophisticated distributed architectures

    and algorithms to make data highly available and durable. To im-

    prove security, data at rest is typically encrypted, and decrypted

    only when/where necessary. The encryption keys themselves must

    be similarly durable and available; however, directly providing all keys towhichever service needs to use them unnecessarily increases

    the attack surface. For the most sensitive keys, it is more prudent to

    encapsulate them within a separate distributed encryption service.

    Such a service allows the creation of new keys, and uses these

    keys to encrypt and decrypt data, but does not expose the keys

    themselves to clients.

    The subject of this paper is the AWS domain management proto-

    col (henceforth abbreviated DMP), a distributed encryption service

    underlying the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Key Management Ser-

    vice (KMS [5]). AWS KMS, a core component of the AWS cloud, lets

    AWS customers create and manage encryption keys, providing a

    consistent view of encryption/decryption operations across AWS

    services, and controlling their use through AWS Identity and Access

    Management (IAM). 1 The widespread usage of AWS KMS and the

    central role of the DMP justifies a high-assurance security proof,

    leveraging recent developments in computer-aided cryptography

    such as [3, 4, 7].

    In this paper, we present a fully mechanized, concrete proof of

    security of the DMP. Informally, the proof shows that the DMP

    provides an idealized encryption service.

    Security goal. The DMP is designed to protect the confidentiality

    of data encrypted under domain keys and guarantee the correct

    operation of the interface it provides, even in the presence of a

    malicious individual interfering with the inner workings of the sys-

    tem. In particular, we consider an adversary that can commission

    and decommission hosts and HSMs (Hardware Security Modules),

    assumed to be under adversarial control, and manipulate (insert,

    delete, modify) messages exchanged between system entities. Our

    1 Within AWS KMS, the DMP is used only to encrypt and decrypt customer master

    keys, the roots of the customer key hierarchies. The use of these master keys, and the

    design of KMS (outside of the DMP itself) is described in [5].

    Session 1C: Cloud Security I CCS ’19, November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom

    63

     

     

    goal is to show that such an adversary cannot gain further advan-

    tage than possibly causing the system to go unresponsive.

    Formally, this security goal is defined using an ideal functionality

    and the real-vs-ideal world paradigm, similarly to the Universal

    Composability [14] framework. We prove that the DMP is indis-

    tinguishable from an idealized encryption service to an arbitrary

    external environment that can collude with a malicious insider

    adversary. This formalization captures precisely the security that

    the rest of AWS KMS needs from the DMP.

    Main Theorem. Our main theorem states that the DMP behaves

    like an ideal authenticated encryption service. The theorem rules

    out attacks from arbitrary computationally bounded adversaries,

    under standard cryptographic assumptions for digital signatures,

    hash-functions and encryption schemes. Formally, we prove that

    the probability of breaking the protocol is smaller than

    2 · ( (qops + qhid) · ϵsig + qdom · ϵaead + ϵcr + ϵmrpke + ϵcoll

    ) ,

    where qops and qhid are upper bounds on the number of human op-

    erators and HSMs in the system, respectively; qdom upper-bounds

    the number of domain keys; ϵsig, ϵaead and ϵcr denote the maxi-

    mum probabilities of breaking a standard signature, authenticated

    encryption and cryptographic hash function, respectively; ϵmrpke denotes the maximum probability of breaking a multi-recipient

    variant of public-key encryption; and ϵcoll is a small statistical term

    related to collisions of signature verification keys. The security of

    cryptographic signatures, hashes, and authenticated encryption im-

    plies that all of the epsilons above (and hence the total probability

    of breaking the protocol) are negligible. A more precise statement

    of the concrete cryptographic setting and bound can be found in

    Sections 4 and 5.

    Formalization. The proof is fully machine-checked in EasyCrypt [6],

    a proof assistant for cryptographic proofs. The development is

    15K lines of code (loc), of which 500 loc comprise the protocol

    specification. Besides being the largest EasyCrypt development

    to date, the proof combines game-hopping techniques that are

    standard in cryptographic proofs, and rich inductive reasoning that

    is standard in program verification. The machine-checked proof is

    novel for the following reasons:

    • We formalize a notion of key secrecy for KMS DMP in the style of

    cryptographic APIs [23] and extend prior work in this area by i.

    addressing a substantially more complex (distributed) API; and ii.

    making explicit which assumptions on the behaviour of human

    operators are necessary (as otherwise trivial breaks would be

    possible), whilst excluding all non-trivial breaks as in prior work

    by reducing to standard cryptographic assumptions.

    • We relate the above definition of security with a real-vs-ideal

    world security definition for encryption services, by proving

    a (reusable) general composition result for combining crypto-

    graphic key management APIs with AEAD schemes. Our result-

    ing top-level security theorem establishes that KMS DMP is as

    good as an ideal authenticated encryption service in the specified

    trust model.

    • The machine-checked proof follows best proof engineering prac-

    tices and favors reusable components, breaking down the verifi-

    cation effort in three types of steps:

    i. reusable results that lift standard cryptographic assumptions

    on signatures and hash functions to idealized versions that

    permit reasoning symbolically about complex invariants on

    authenticated data structures;

    ii. use rich inductive reasoning to prove that intricate authentica-

    tion invariants hold in the security experiments, and rewrite

    (slice) the code of the security games to make explicit the split

    between data which is under adversarial control (due to trivial

    strategies that do not contradict the security claim) and data

    which is outside of the adversary’s reach; and

    iii. build on the previous results to conduct a game hopping proof

    that, first, idealizes digital signatures and hash functions, accou-

    ting for concrete (negligible) security losses; then modularly

    uses the authentication invariants to perform security experi-

    ment slicing; and finally reduces the key-secrecy property to

    the security of multi-recipient encryption.

    Paper Structure. In Section 2 we give a bird’s eye view of our ap-

    proach and provide a road-map for the paper, before moving on to

    more technical sections. In Section 3 we give a detailed description

    of the DMP and of its formalization in EasyCrypt. Then, in Section 4

    we formalize the security model that we have adopted and in which

    we have proved security of the DMP. In Section 5 we describe the

    machine-checked security proof. Section 6 gives an overview of the

    improvements to EasyCrypt that were developed during the project.

    Section 8 contains a summary of related work, and Section 9 the

    concluding remarks.

    2 OVERVIEW In this section we present an overview of the DMP goals and inter-

    face, and then outline the structure and contents of the EasyCrypt

    model and proof (shown in Figure 1).

    DMP Concepts. The fundamental unit of security in the DMP is

    a domain. Each domain provides an independent distributed en-

    cryption functionality using a combination of machines and people

    (collectively referred to as entities) which may change over time.

    Each entity can participate in multip

     

    SOLUTION

In the real world, security is a complex and constantly evolving issue. There are many threats to security, including physical threats such as theft, violence, and terrorism, as well as digital threats such as cyber attacks, data breaches, and online scams. In the real world, security measures are often reactive, meaning that they are put in place after a threat has been identified or an attack has occurred. This can make it difficult to stay ahead of evolving threats and to prevent them from happening in the first place.

On the other hand, in an ideal world, security would be proactive and preventative. Security measures would be designed to anticipate potential threats and prevent them from occurring, rather than simply responding to them after the fact. In an ideal world, security measures would also be seamless and unobtrusive, allowing people to go about their daily lives without feeling constantly watched or monitored.

However, it is important to note that the ideal world is not always attainable. In the real world, security measures are often a trade-off between security and convenience, and it can be difficult to strike the right balance. Furthermore, security measures can be expensive, and many organizations and individuals may not have the resources to implement the most effective security measures.

Ultimately, while the ideal of perfect security may be unattainable, it is important to continually strive for better security in the real world. This requires a combination of proactive measures, such as risk assessments and threat analysis, as well as reactive measures, such as incident response plans and crisis management. Additionally, it is important to balance security with other important values, such as privacy, freedom, and accessibility.

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